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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

28 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: The Eichmann Case^{1/}

1. The Eichmann trial is scheduled to begin in Israel on 11 April, with every assurance that it will receive the extensive publicity in most of the world press and in radio and television coverage. The legal and moral aspects of the case do not concern us here. What is of intelligence interest, however, are the political and propaganda implications of the trial. There will be considerable latitude for various interested states to exploit the proceedings for their own purposes.^{2/}

Israel

2. Israel, as the nation most directly concerned, is interested in seeing that the world does not forget what the Jews of Europe suffered under Hitler, and in underlining Israel's claims

^{1/} This memorandum has been discussed with DD/P.

^{2/} Annex reproduces some propaganda highlights from Bloc, Israeli, and Arab sources concerning the Eichmann case.

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to be the moral heir and trustee of the victims. If in the course of the trial the allegations against Eichmann or his own revelations also damage Israel's current enemies, this will not go unnoticed. The large body of evidence concerning the case will almost certainly include material tending to link Nazi and Arab attitudes toward Zionism and Israel over the years. Israeli propaganda has already charged that Nasser and Nazis still at large have been in contact and have discussed how to minimize the adverse effects of the Eichmann case. The Israeli Government can, and probably will, see to it that political and propaganda advantages of this sort are not lost in the conduct of the trial.

3. A more difficult question is how far the Israeli Government is prepared to go in avoiding or playing down aspects which might embarrass people or governments friendly to Israel -- notably the West German Government. (The Israeli foreign ministry has already felt compelled to deny allegations that they have made any agreement with a "foreign government" to take such action.) On the whole, we doubt that the Israeli Government will feel inclined, or able if it were inclined, to manipulate the proceedings for such purposes to any great extent. However much Ben Gurion might prefer to avoid embarrassing Adenauer, evidence implicating some of his current associates, such as Globke, would be difficult

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to suppress in view of sustained Bloc propaganda charges, and it would be very risky for the Israeli Government to try it. On the other hand, there is evidence that Eichmann will not in fact implicate Globke in his testimony. Even if this proves true, it seems almost inevitable that other West German officials will be implicated.

The Arabs

4. The Arabs have so far devoted little attention to the matter -- beyond questioning Israel's right to kidnap Eichmann from Argentina. Such UAR propaganda as has been devoted to the substance of the case has taken the form of allegations that Eichmann's testimony implicates certain Israeli or Zionist leaders in deals with the Nazi leadership during World War II. There is enough substance to these charges to make a certain amount of useful anti-Zionist propaganda, but this is about all the political advantage the Arabs can hope to get out of the matter.

The Bloc

5. The tactical approach of the Bloc to the Eichmann case is already shaping up: a concerted effort will be made to turn the case against the Federal German Republic by way of charging

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that former Nazis are in key positions there and determine the Bloc propaganda will concentrate its attack on one man, Hans "revanchist" character of Bonn's policies. To this end, Globke, high-ranking civil servant and right-hand man to the German Chancellor. This propaganda will attempt to present Globke as the principal architect of the Nuernberg racial laws and of the persecution which flowed from them; as Eichmann's immediate supervisor in the task of achieving a "final solution" of the Jewish "problem"; and as a fanatic who prevented any mercy being shown the Jewish population of Salonika.

6. Simultaneously the West German Government will be accused of doing its best to shield Globke and, by implication, to uphold and continue the policies of rearmament and revanchism which Globke represents. The attack on Globke will carry with it the implication that in the person of Eichmann the Bonn Government is itself on trial.

7. At the present juncture, however, it is not altogether clear whether the campaign against West Germany is to remain primarily in the realm of rumor, innuendo, and anonymous pamphlet, or whether it is to be given a complete orchestration of all the propaganda instruments of the Bloc regimes. On the one hand, Bloc leaders hope to smear West Germany as the inheritor of Nazi policies

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and thus to disqualify the Bonn Government morally in the competition between the two German regimes. Bloc strategists might also hope that the Globke affair would become a bone of contention in the upcoming West German election, spreading confusion and bitterness.

8. Nonetheless there are reasons why Bloc leaders may wish to limit exploitation of the Eichmann case. For example, to the extent that the Soviets increase the publicity given to the trial, they will contribute to sympathy for Israel and thus possibly embarrass themselves in dealing with the Arabs, and enhance the status of Israel among Soviet Jews. Moreover, Eichmann's testimony may implicate one or more of the key Nazi refugees -- e.g., Dirlwanger or Eisele -- who have found asylum or employment in the UAR. It is also possible that evidence given in the trial may suggest that the Soviets are giving aid and direction to surviving hard-core Nazi groups devoted to the overthrow of the West German Government. Finally, the testimony might implicate certain ex-Nazis in East Germany or Poland, though we do not believe that any such are in high enough position to embarrass the regimes.

9. Thus, it appears to us that Bloc authorities will tend to play the case by ear, selectively, and differently for different

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audiences. The chances are at least even that the Bloc propaganda campaign will stop short of all-out exploitation of the trial.

West Germany

10. The West Germans have followed the Eichmann case developments and the impending trial with growing apprehension, sometimes bordering on hysteria. The unarticulated though widely-held concern among Germans is that Eichmann's revelations might implicate West Germans now prominent in business, cultural, political and, above all, governmental life. They are concerned that the publicity resulting from the trial will give new impetus to what they regard as an already existing anti-German trend, both popular and official, in the Western world, particularly in the US and UK. The best-seller status of the Shirer book on the Third Reich, the ill-feeling generated by the recent financial negotiations between the US and the Federal Republic and other miscellaneous "straws in the wind" are interpreted by West German political leaders and the press as confirmation of these fears.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

for SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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